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# Population, Resources, and Politics in the Third World: The Long View

An Intelligence Assessment

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GI 84-10022  
January 1984

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**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 31 December 1983  
was used in this report.*

In this paper we expand upon several lines of research currently under way in the DI to take a speculative look at the Third World in the year 2000. We examine how trends in population, ethnic composition, urbanization, resources, water, and food may impact upon a selected number of cities, countries, and regions of interest to the United States. The momentum behind these trends is great—they will not be halted, and they are unlikely even to be seriously deflected during the next two decades. Their political impact is less certain, however, and present and future policy choices will have an effect in this area. Our approach in examining these trends is illustrative rather than exhaustive.

Rapid population growth, in addition to having other harmful effects, can lead to the encroachment of one nation upon the territory of another through migration, war, or colonization. The great and increasing differences in population density (relative to resources) between Mexico and the United States, El Salvador and Honduras, Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, and Vietnam and Kampuchea and Laos will give rise to serious international problems well before the end of the century.

A separate set of problems is created by uneven rates of population growth among different ethnic groups within a country. Where population growth creates a discrepancy between the relative size and the relative political strength of an ethnic group, a state of tension is created. In Israel, Lebanon, and elsewhere, we see situations arising in which new majorities will demand greater power while old majorities now in minority positions will fight to retain their privileges. Rapid urbanization, though sometimes politically stabilizing, can have a variety of effects. We believe that the necessity to divert population from Mexico City will be Mexico's most serious problem at the turn of the century; elsewhere the effects of urbanization could range from a loss of political power (Sao Paulo) to a revolt of the middle class (Cairo).

With regard to resources, technological change is steadily reducing the real value of such products as copper, tin, and sugar. Those countries—such as Zambia, Bolivia, and Cuba—that depend on these and similar commodities for the bulk of their export earnings could face a substantial and continued reduction in living standards. Other resources, including water and food, will be in increasingly short supply in some areas of the world, and these shortages could lead to international and internal friction. We

expect serious water-related disputes over the Colorado and the Rio Grande (United States and Mexico), the Jordan and the Litani (Israel and its neighbors), and the Nile (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt). At the same time, natural causes and human mistakes are creating politically destabilizing food shortages in the Sahel and southern Africa. ☐

The deteriorating economic and demographic situation of most of the developing world in the year 2000 will stimulate many Third World leaders to look for political systems that will allow them to control their increasingly unhappy populations. We believe that most of these leaders will see US-style democracy as incapable of dealing effectively with their national problems. Some leaders, even among those who have little sympathy for Marxist ideology, will turn to Communism as a proven method for creating an effective police state. Others will be attracted to the more successful authoritarian states of the Third World, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Mexico. On balance, we believe that the Soviets will find their best opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Middle East, probable Soviet losses may not translate into US gains. In Latin America, the rising economic cost of maintaining Cuba may limit the Soviet appetite for meddling. ☐

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## Population, Resources, and Politics in the Third World: The Long View ☐

### Introduction: The Third World in the Year 2000

The countries of the Third World are often considered to be static areas where, despite superficial revolutions and meaningless wars, nothing really changes. If this description were ever true, which is doubtful, it is no longer true today. Gradual but inexorable changes are taking place, largely unnoticed, and by the year 2000 many Third World countries will be very different in a number of important ways. Moreover, some of the changes will have major implications for the security and well-being of the United States. In this study, we examine six areas of change as they relate to Third World countries of particular importance to US interests. Although this study is based on a solid foundation of past and ongoing DDI research, because of the extended time frame, its conclusions and projections are of necessity more speculative than those of most DI papers. In cases of doubt, we have decided to study the more provocative—and troublesome—of possible outcomes. ☐

### Population Growth: Four Countries That Are Outgrowing Their Borders

Rapid population growth can have a number of different effects, one of the most important of which is the encroachment of one nation upon the territory of another through migration, war, or colonization. The juxtaposition of lightly populated lands (relative to their economic resources) with countries where population is both large and rapidly increasing (and economic resources are limited) gives rise to migrant flows that, although they can be regulated by diplomacy, bribery, or force, cannot be completely stopped. We will consider four such cases: Mexico and the United States, El Salvador and Honduras, Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, and Vietnam and Kampuchea and Laos. ☐

#### Mexico

We have made two projections for Mexican population growth between now and the year 2000. Under our low projection, population—now 76 million—

would reach 110 million by the turn of the century; under the high projection, it would reach 126 million. Mexican population thus would probably range between 42 percent and 49 percent of the US population at that time. Population densities would be between 55 and 64 people per square kilometer, compared with roughly 29 people per square kilometer in the United States.<sup>1</sup> Because of the age structure of the Mexican population, the effect of demographic growth on the labor force—that segment of the population most likely to consider entering the United States—will be even greater. At least 41 million, and possibly as many as 46 million, Mexicans will be in the labor force at the end of the century, roughly double the current number. ☐

By the turn of the century, if the same percentage of the labor force chooses to migrate illegally to the United States, the annual flow would be well over 2 million. During the austerity year of 1983, we estimate that 1.5 million Mexicans crossed the US border illegally, compared with an estimated 800,000 to 1,100,000 annually in other recent years. Although the vast majority of these illegal migrants do not remain permanently in the United States at present, this may be changing. As the mix of rural agricultural workers and urban factory and service workers changes in favor of the latter—and this is happening—we expect the percentage of long-term migrants to increase. ☐

<sup>1</sup> In this paper, crude population densities have been used for the comparison of relative population pressures in neighboring countries. A more meaningful density based on land area with some economic utility would be preferable, but such a measurement is not available on a consistent basis. To be exact, overpopulation or underpopulation must be defined in terms of the state of economic development of a country and the economic utility of its land area, given existing technology. In these terms, even in the absence of precise density indexes, it is clear that most LDCs are overpopulated to varying degrees, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. ☐

### **Other Countries With Population Problems**

*Most Third World nations are overpopulated, and demographic pressures exacerbate economic and social problems, even if they do not yet present a direct threat to political stability. Only a few countries, such as Brazil, have large sparsely settled areas that can accommodate great increases in people, and even in Brazil filling these areas would entail economic and ecological costs as well as benefits. A few other countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, have small populations relative to their resources and low population growth rates; population expansion should not be a problem for these nations.* ☐

*Two countries, Kenya and Syria, are projected to double their populations by the year 2000. A number of other countries will double their populations before 2010. All of these nations will face serious population-driven problems well before that time. In Africa these countries include: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Asia they include: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, Mongolia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, and Vietnam. In Latin America they include: Belize, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent, and Venezuela. Elsewhere, they include: Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.* ☐

### **El Salvador**

El Salvador, with 220 persons per square kilometer, is the most densely populated noninsular nation in the Western Hemisphere; it shares a long border with Honduras, which, with 38 people per square kilometer, is the least densely populated country in Central America. Population pressures that led some 300,000 Salvadorans to emigrate to Honduras between World War II and the late 1960s also contributed to the 1969 "Soccer War" between the two countries. Despite the current convergence of interest between the two conservative, anti-Communist governments, illegal migration continues and a number of border disputes remain unresolved. ☐

The situation can only get worse in the future. By the end of the century, El Salvador's population, currently 4.7 million, will have grown to 7.4 million, and the population density will be a suffocating 346 persons per square kilometer. Honduras, although growing more rapidly, will still have a density of only 62 persons per square kilometer. Birth control measures, even in the unlikely case that they were adopted on a wide scale, would do little to alleviate the problem between now and the end of the century. Land reform is also at best a partial answer; with 42 percent of its small land area unsuitable for either cultivation or pasturage, there is no way that El Salvador can employ its expanding population in agriculture. Its once-promising industrial sector, largely destroyed by leftist violence that drove out foreign investment, is unlikely to revive soon, even if peace can be achieved. Indeed, the only circumstances that we foresee that could significantly alter the outlook for population increase would be the continuation of El Salvador's internal war at much higher levels of violence. ☐



next two decades, both the competitiveness and the eagerness of many of these countries will increase.

If, at the turn of the century, Egypt is no longer able to export a large portion of its labor force, the effects will probably be felt both in Egypt and throughout the region. Given the relatively high level of education and political awareness of the Egyptian people—including the unemployed—mob-pressured government decisions, rapidly changing administrations, and general political instability are to be expected. An external military adventure is also possible. With a crying need for arable land, a large population, and one of the better military establishments of the Arab world, Cairo might see military conquest as a solution to its problems or at least as a diversion for its people.

### **Egypt**

Egypt, with a population of 45.9 million squeezed into a largely arid country where less than 3 percent of the land is suitable for agriculture, has no place to go but out.<sup>2</sup> Unlike Mexico and El Salvador, however, Egypt has not relied upon illegal migration or war but upon the legal export of labor. Egyptian office workers, teachers, doctors, and laborers can be found throughout the Middle East and in Western Europe and North America as well. In 1982 an estimated 1.7 million Egyptians—roughly 13 percent of the labor force—worked abroad. The importance of these workers to the economic viability of Egypt is even greater than their number would suggest; the remittances that these workers send home through official channels—estimated at \$2.3 billion in 1982—are a major source of foreign exchange.

By the year 2000, Egypt's population will number between 70 and 80 million, and the labor force will have nearly doubled to about 22 million. The demand for Egyptian labor abroad, however, will probably have stagnated and may well have declined. The rapid economic growth of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East will have long since moderated and with it the need for Egyptian labor. Competition for those jobs that remain will be heavy. Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, the Yemens, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have all shown themselves capable of competing with Egypt for the petroleum dollar. We expect that, over the

### **Vietnam**

Vietnam, like El Salvador, is a densely populated country sharing a long border with an area of much lighter population. In mid-1983, Vietnam's population of 57 million gave it a density of 173 persons per square kilometer. Laos, with a population of 3.6 million, had a density of 15 persons per square kilometer, while Kampuchea, with a population of 6 million, had a density of 33 persons per square kilometer. Although a quest for security, combined with ideological and historical factors, fueled the recent drive to the west, which resulted in a thinly veiled takeover of government in Laos and Kampuchea, areas of Kampuchea have for years been colonized by Vietnamese civilians. This movement, which was reversed during the Pol Pot years, has reemerged and now involves 300,000 to 400,000 people. (S NF)

At the turn of the century, Vietnam is projected to have a population of between 75 and 90 million, which could give it a density of as many as 273 people per square kilometer. During the period, the population of Kampuchea probably will have climbed to only 8.1 million (density 45) and that of Laos to 5.2 million

<sup>2</sup> Although Egypt is one of the most industrialized of Arab states, industry employs only a small portion of the labor force. (U)

(density 22). Thus, from the standpoint of population pressure, Vietnam would continue to have strong incentives to maintain and expand the colonization of the rest of Indochina. ☐

The danger that this situation poses for US interests is that what was initially a problem of localized aggression could evolve into a major international confrontation. Given Vietnam's military superiority, it is unlikely that the people of Laos and Kampuchea could effectively oppose Vietnamese imperialism without the active aid of a major power, almost certainly China. In the event of Chinese intervention on a large scale—and no small-scale intervention would deter Hanoi—the Soviet Union would be under pressure to give Vietnam whatever support was needed to counter the Chinese effort. This could take the form of military operations on the Soviet-Chinese border. Although caution and good sense on the part of both China and the USSR may preserve the peace for years or decades, the situation is unlikely to improve. The pressures for Vietnamese colonization will grow in pace with the population. It is a time bomb that cannot be defused. ☐

#### **Population Composition: Three Countries Where Ethnic Change May Drive Politics**

In addition to the problems created by rapid population growth in general, there is a separate set of problems associated with uneven rates of population growth among different ethnic groups in a single country. In nondemocratic as well as democratic nations, the size of an ethnic group tends to determine its political power. Where a discrepancy exists between the relative size and the relative political strength of a group, a state of tension is created. New majorities demand greater power, while old majorities now in minority positions fight to retain their privileges. In extreme situations, this can lead to partition, revolution, or genocide. We will consider three countries—Israel, Lebanon, and South Africa—where ethnic change could affect political stability. ☐

#### **Israel**

Israel, despite being the Jewish homeland, is a multi-ethnic, multireligious country. Israel proper has a population of a little over 4 million, of which roughly

1.5 million are Jews of American or European origin, 1.8 million are Jews of African or Asian origin, and 0.7 million are non-Jews. An additional 1.2 million non-Jews live on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Outside of Israel and Israeli-occupied territory live some 2 million Palestinians. Almost all of these Palestinians consider Israeli-controlled areas as home, and we estimate that a large portion would return if given the opportunity. Within Israel, the Jewish population is growing at 1.6 percent annually (with the non-Western Jewish population growing much more rapidly than the European-American Jewish population), and the non-Jewish population is growing at 3.1 percent a year. The Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza is growing at annual rates of 2.1 and 3.1 percent respectively, while the rate for Palestinians elsewhere is about 2 percent. ☐

By the year 2000, according to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, non-Jews will make up 23 percent of the population of Israel proper and 32 percent of that part of the population under the age of 15. If the West Bank and Gaza were to be annexed, this figure would rise to 41 percent, and in the early decades of the 21st century the number of non-Jews would exceed the number of Jews. If a portion of the Palestinian Diaspora were allowed to return—probably only under the unlikely occurrence that an autonomy agreement is negotiated for the occupied territories—these trends would be accelerated. At the same time, within the Jewish community the non-Western population would greatly increase its majority. ☐

Thus, no matter what policies are followed, Israel will look very different by the end of the century. Even if there is no incorporation of occupied territory, almost a quarter of the Israelis will be non-Jewish and the remaining three-quarters will be heavily non-Western in origin. Under these circumstances, we believe that the close ties between Israel and Western nations and between Israelis and foreign Jews could be weakened, public and private aid could decrease, living standards could stagnate, and Israel could come more closely to resemble the typical country of the Middle East. On the other hand, if the West Bank and Gaza were annexed, Israel would cease either to be a Jewish state or a democracy. ☐

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### **Other Countries With Ethnic Problems**

*Most countries of Africa and Asia face a myriad of problems caused by tribal, ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions. In the majority of these countries, we expect problems to worsen over the next two decades. North-south conflicts in the Sudan; Somali irredentism in Ethiopia; the relationship between the Kikuyu and other groups in Kenya; the division of power among Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo in Nigeria; the position of the Katangans in Zaire; and the Shona suppression of Ndebele in Zimbabwe are only a few of the ethnic situations that could cause serious political unrest in Africa well before the year 2000.* ☐

*In Asia, we see continuing dangers in Syria, where the ruling Alawites constitute a small minority of the population; in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, where large numbers of foreign "guest workers" could press for increased political power and where ancient Persian-Arab, Shia-Sunni conflict could worsen; in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, where the Kurdish struggle refuses to die; in Pakistan, invaded by Pushtun refugees and divided among antagonistic Punjabi, Sindhi, and Baluch; in India, an "empire" where northern Indian, Hindi-speaking Hindus are trying to control a vast number of peoples of different ethnic, religious, and linguistic background; in Sri*

*Lanka, where Sinhalese-Tamil conflict could eventually lead India to intervene; and in the Philippines, where Moros continue their centuries-old battle against Christian central government.* ☐

*In the Western Hemisphere, by contrast, the ethnic situation is less dangerous. Indians are of political importance only in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. In Mexico and Bolivia, while the Indians remain an underclass, they have benefited from land reforms and other "indigenist" measures of the revolutions of 1910 (Mexico) and 1952 (Bolivia); any dangers they may present will be as members of the peasantry, not as Indians. Despite the efforts of leftist revolutionaries to enlist Guatemala's Indians, they remain politically cautious "risk avoiders," divided by language and custom, and suspicious of each other. While the Indians of Peru and Ecuador have serious grievances, their importance as a political factor will decrease as the non-Indian population grows. Black-white conflict in Brazil may increase but is unlikely to become regime threatening. The same is true of black-Asian conflict in Guyana, Suriname, and some West Indian islands.* ☐

### **Lebanon**

In no country have ethnic and religious divisions played a more important role than in Lebanon. Indeed, the relative size of the various groups is of such great political sensitivity that the Lebanese Government has long refused to undertake a census that could be used to justify changes in the allocation of power. The last official census was taken by the French in 1932, and it is suspected by many Lebanese and foreign experts of overcounting the Christian population. By the 1932 count, 30 percent of the population was Maronite Christian, 23 percent was other Christian, 21 percent was Sunni Muslim, 19 percent was Shia Muslim, and the remaining 7 percent was Druze. In the early 1940s, when Lebanon was achieving self-rule and eventual independence, this population distribution was used to allocate political power; certain offices were reserved

for certain sects—for example, the president had to be a Maronite and the prime minister a Sunni Muslim—and in the Chamber of Deputies six Christian seats were established for every five non-Christian seats. (c)

This hard shell of government structure has remained in place, while its population base has radically changed. By 1983, according to a recent CIA estimate, the Maronite population had fallen to 17 percent and that of the other Christian sects to 10 percent of the total. At the same time, the Shia population had spiraled to 40 percent, while that of the Sunni had edged up to 26 percent and that of the Druze had remained at 7 percent. Refugees from

Israeli-held territory and later from Jordan swelled the Palestinian population from almost nothing to about 400,000. The resulting imbalance between population and power has been the root cause of civil wars in the 1950s, the 1970s, and the 1980s, while population changes that left Maronite muscle unequal to Maronite pretensions gave rise to three foreign interventions—by the United States in 1958, Syria in 1976, and Israel in 1982—to protect minority Christian interests. Although they may strike up temporary alliances, no two of these groups have the same interests: Sunni do not get along with Shia, non-Maronite Christians have no love for Maronites, Lebanese of all faiths resent Palestinians, and most other sects distrust the Druze, who are neither Christian nor Muslim. ☐

The future of Lebanon—if Lebanon continues to exist—will almost certainly be one of continued ethnic and religious strife. By the year 2000, the Shia—currently the most deprived segment of the country, both politically and economically, with strong ties to radical Iran and Libya—will make up at least 45 percent of the population. This group will demand its share of power and then some and find itself in conflict not only with Christians, but also with Sunnis, who for their part will be increasingly resentful over their loss of primacy among Muslims. The Druze and the various Christian sects, faced with the relative declines of their populations, will tend even more than at present to isolate themselves in semitribal enclaves. The Palestinians, assuming that they have found no other home, will drift back into Lebanon in large numbers, as Syria may promote such a move and there will be no central government powerful enough to stop them. Like all other elements of the population, they will be well armed. The Maronites, as ever playing upon their ambiguous heritage as Christian Arabs, will alternately call upon Arab states, Israel, and the West to protect their interests. Neighboring states, and perhaps major powers, may be tempted to intervene. Partition, absorption, and major war must be included among the possible scenarios. ☐

#### **South Africa**

Although the already large black majority in South Africa will increase between now and the year 2000, ethnic changes within the white community could be

more important in driving political change. The basically undemocratic situation at present, in which 15 percent of the population rules the remaining 85 percent, will not be made appreciably less democratic when the white population drops to 13 percent at the end of the century. Nor will white ability to dominate the black majority be seriously undermined by the small change in relative population sizes. Indeed, if the Colored and Indian populations were co-opted into at least a tacit political alliance with whites, those with a stake in the status quo in the year 2000 would constitute 23 percent of the total population—representing a marginal gain for the minority and its capacity to control the black majority. ☐

Other demographic changes, however, could modify this scenario. The proportion of Afrikaners in total white population is declining as a result of several factors: the Afrikaner birth rate is falling rapidly; intermarriage between Afrikaners and English-speaking whites is increasing, with English generally becoming the dominant language of the offspring; and most white immigrants are English speakers or soon become English speakers. In the past, English speakers, with ties to the rest of the English-speaking world, have been more liberal in political and racial matters than the “cornered” Afrikaners, who feel that they have no homeland other than Africa. At the same time, according to some authorities, tribal divisions within the black population are becoming less important. Until recently, for example, the Xhosa have been the backbone of the African National Congress and other violent revolutionary groups, while the Zulu and other tribes have tended to support nonviolent reformist organizations. Now, however, increasingly large segments of the black population of all tribal origins are reported to be supporting revolutionary movements. ☐

Thus, in the year 2000, the majority of the privileged class could consist of relatively liberal—by South African standards—English-speaking whites, Coloreds, and Indians. The conservative Afrikaners, though still a majority of the white population and still dominating the political process, would constitute

only 30 percent of this expanded privileged class. Meanwhile, the black majority may have become both more unified and more radical. In these circumstances, many in the privileged class would be more disposed than ever before both to make far-reaching compromises and—if compromise should fail—to leave South Africa. ☐

#### **Urbanization: Four Cities Likely To Become Hot Spots**

Recent empirical research indicates that, all other things being equal, rapid urbanization is politically stabilizing. Studies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia agree that the rural migrant to the city slums is almost always more contented and supportive of the government than his cousin who remains in rural poverty. Although in general we agree with this characterization of the relationship between urbanization and stability, in this section we will examine four cases—Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Cairo, and Soweto—where “all other things” are not equal, and continued rapid urbanization could lead to serious political unrest (see figure 1). ☐

#### **Mexico City**



Urbanization, particularly the rapid growth of greater Mexico City, will be a major political problem for the Mexican Government well before the turn of the century. Greater Mexico City, with some 15 million people, has almost doubled its population since 1970. Each day nearly 1,000 migrants enter the area from the countryside or from other cities. Moreover, the flow appears to be increasing as other cities (such as Guadalajara and Monterrey) that were once major poles of rural-urban migration have lost some of their attraction. If greater Mexico City were to continue growing at recent rates, the population would exceed 25 million by 1990 and 40 million by the year 2000. Even if migration to the Mexico City area were to fall to the national urbanization rate, the area would still have 30 million inhabitants at the turn of the century. Indeed, natural increase alone—without any migration from the outside—would raise the population to more than 25 million by the year 2000. ☐

All of these scenarios are impossible; given land and water constraints, the Valley of Mexico can only support some 20 million people. Thus, well before the end of the century the Mexican Government must find some combination of carrots and sticks, not only to stop migration to Mexico City, but also to force a part of the native-born population out of the capital. This will be extremely difficult. From pre-Hispanic times, Mexico City has been the nation's center of culture, excitement, good living, power, and opportunity. Every Mexican considers it his right to go to the capital to better himself, to escape past failures, or simply to be part of the action. No government has ever made a serious attempt to restrict the Mexican citizen's freedom of movement; the extension of government authoritarianism into this area would be without precedent. ☐

Some experts believe that, as population presses harder on resources, the quality of life in Mexico City will decline to such an extent that more people will be trying to leave than to enter the area. This seems doubtful. Despite the massive inflow of rural migrants to the squatter settlements around Mexico City, incomes are becoming more equal in the city even as inequality grows in the nation as a whole. This means that, on the average, one will still improve oneself economically by moving to the city. And most migrants beat the average—statistics indicate that, when other factors are held constant, migrants to Mexico City advance faster and achieve higher status than native residents. Moreover, the glamour of the capital will remain for years if not decades after economic opportunities disappear and living conditions deteriorate. ☐

Unless other poles of urban growth can be created—and this effort would take quantities of time, money, and wisdom that Mexican governments may not have—the only solution is probably to expand the limits of greater Mexico City beyond the Valley of Mexico. Greatly increased tax rates and a crackdown on squatter settlements in the federal district (both

**Figure 1**  
**Estimated Growth of Large LDC Cities, 1975-2000**



very costly in political terms) could push even native-born residents beyond the valley. At the same time the creation of high-speed transportation links (costly in economic terms) could bring a greatly expanded area into the new, greater Mexico City. These solutions, partial at best, will only buy time, and their implementation could put severe strains on the political system. ☐

### **Sao Paulo**

The problems of urbanization in Brazil are less clear than those of Mexico—in part at least because Brazilian statistics are less complete than their Mexican counterparts—but only slightly less disturbing. Greater Sao Paulo, like Mexico City, has long been a favored destination for migrants from nearby rural areas as well as from distant parts of the country such as the poverty-stricken northeast. This seems to be changing. Incomplete statistics indicate that the rate of migration into the southeast has been falling for some time and that migration is steadily becoming less of a factor in Paulino population growth. Moreover, there appears to be a growing current of out-migration to Brazil's frontier states. Nonetheless, net migration remains positive and the city's population, now more than 12 million, continues to grow. ☐

Although most projections show Sao Paulo's population continuing to expand at 4 percent or better through the rest of the century, we suspect that these projections are wrong. We believe that, by the year 2000 or shortly thereafter, Sao Paulo and perhaps other parts of the industrial southeast will exhibit an absolute population decline—much like that experienced by New York and other areas of the industrial northeast of the United States in the 1970s. Our belief is based on several trends now in progress: foreign and domestic industry has begun to locate or relocate in areas of Brazil where wages are lower, government incentives are greater, and unionization is less advanced; growth of the frontier states is accelerating, drawing the ambitious both from Sao Paulo and from areas that once provided migrants to Sao Paulo; and the quality of life in Sao Paulo is declining. ☐

Evidence for this decline in the quality of life may be seen on a number of fronts. Infant mortality rates in Sao Paulo, after having fallen from 160.5 to 69.4—exceptionally good by Brazilian standards—between

1950 and 1965, rose steadily to 94.6 by 1973. Though varying from year to year, they remain well above levels of the early 1960s. Real wages have fallen. For example, the cost of cassava flour, a staple of the Brazilian diet, in terms of hours worked, rose 43.6 percent in Sao Paulo between 1969 and 1976, compared with only 4.5 percent in the northeastern city of Recife. Other fragmentary statistics reveal increasing deficiencies in housing, potable water, nutrition, and education, as well as increasing crime. Most recently, Sao Paulo has been the site of a number of "hunger riots," in which supermarkets and food warehouses have been looted. ☐

If our scenario is correct and the city of Sao Paulo (and probably some other urban areas of the southeast) begins to lose population around the turn of the century, the accompanying political strains could be considerable. No major shift in relative regional power is easy in countries such as Brazil where regions are clearly defined and have conflicting interests. If, on the other hand, Sao Paulo continues to grow, urban services and the quality of life will almost certainly continue to fall. This too could lead to political frictions and change, though probably of a less basic nature. ☐

### **Cairo**

In the opinion of some experts, Cairo is already on the edge of a civic breakdown. It is the largest urban area in the Middle East and Africa, with a population that has grown from 2 million in 1947 to about 10 million in 1983. Overall density is approaching 25,000 persons per square kilometer, triple that of New York City. In some older neighborhoods, density reaches an incredible 100,000 persons per square kilometer. According to one study, Cairo's urban infrastructure and public facilities are adequate to handle only 2 million people, a fifth of the population. There is a housing shortage of close to 1 million units. Only about two-thirds of existing housing is connected to the antiquated public water system. The public sewerage system, which does not reach many sections of the city, is notorious for its breaks, which regularly flood some sections of Cairo. Public collection of solid waste is

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## The Problem of the Cities

*Population growth projections for most of the largest cities in the LDCs are foreboding. While there is no certainty that this crowding and growing disfunction of urban structures will translate into political instability at national levels, there are many reasons to believe that it will. Each city is a separate case, but there are several perspectives from which all must be examined.* ☐

*First, there is the magnitude of the problem. Although early estimates are already being revised downward, and the forecasts in this paper may also change, reasonable projections of current trends in migration and natural increase will produce monumental numbers. Jakarta, for example, will have to accommodate an additional population greater than Los Angeles or Chicago in just 16 short years. Many would predict even greater numbers there and in Karachi, Bombay, Cairo, and other key cities.* ☐

*Next, the socioeconomic and environmental-infrastructure bases on which these numbers will be imposed must be considered. Given the extensive shanty housing, lack of sewer, water, or electrical connections in large areas of Jakarta, Karachi, Lagos, and elsewhere, a doubling in size would leave a majority of citizens without basic services and in even more primitive and anarchic conditions than at present. In Karachi, for example, only 22 percent of households reportedly have water and sewer connections. Research sponsored by the World Bank in the 1970s showed many large Third World cities already had more than 50 percent living in slums and uncontrolled settlements. Because of the continuing high rates of in-migration, conditions in many places have probably worsened, despite local and UN programs in the field of water supply and sanitation.* ☐

*Perhaps the most telling factors deciding whether rapid population growth translates into political instability will be the efficacy of metropolitan government and the relationship of the city to the national*

*government in budgetary, structural, and political terms. Most large Third World cities, especially the capitals, have a cadre of trained professionals in city management and planning, but the bureaucratic, fiscal, and political constraints within which they must function, added to the magnitude of the problem, make increasing failure of authorities to meet minimal needs almost inevitable. Indeed, so long as entry restrictions are not imposed, metropolitan governments are further faced with the dilemma that, if they improve conditions within the city, more people will come. Even now, for example, refugees from civil strife in Bangladesh or rural conditions in eastern India see Calcutta much differently than better off Calcuttans do. If governments act firmly to restrict entry, force exit, and impose other distasteful measures to make these cities—many of which are capitals—function again, it may be at the expense of whatever democratic institutions that remain, and could lead to civil disorder directed against the authorities. At the present time, most of the Third World countries are placing great hope in voluntary measures such as regional planning that place employment magnets well beyond the city proper and elsewhere within the country to attract migrants now moving into the largest cities. So far these efforts have had limited success in slowing growth.* ☐

*Last, factors external to the city itself enter into the equation. Many of the swollen LDC megacities exploded in an era of rising commodity prices, and—in some cases—oil revenues, and classic boomtown conditions prevailed. Nobody cared so long as the future looked promising. They are now entering an era when the population growth momentum remains, but the ability of governments to finance basic services has deteriorated sharply, and the squalid realities and economic disparities of life in cities that have grown too fast are apparent to all.* ☐



woefully inadequate. Street congestion, pollution, and public transportation deficiencies are serious problems even by Third World standards. ☐

These problems often interact with each other. Inadequate water pressure disrupts waste water disposal. Leaking sewer and water lines interfere with electrical service. Electrical outages disrupt water pumping stations, sewerage facilities, and traffic lights. Inadequate solid waste collection contributes to blocked sewers and pipeline overflows. Unpaved roads cause residents to use water to control dust, thereby reducing water pressure. Construction work to repair one service frequently interferes with other services, as in the January 1983 case when subway construction severed a water main in central Cairo. ☐

By the year 2000, Cairo's population will have doubled to 20 million (despite some reduction in internal migration to the city) and its problems will have worsened. We do not foresee any likely combination of economic prosperity and foreign assistance that would allow the Egyptian Government to keep up with Cairo's problems, much less to solve them. Moreover, we expect the deterioration in the quality of life—hitherto most obvious in the poorer sections of the city—to increasingly affect all its inhabitants. Traffic gridlocks, water and electricity outages, sanitation and health problems, flooding, overcrowding, and general frustration will be the lot of the middle classes and even the rich, as well as the poor. ☐

The political risks of this situation are obvious. Cairo, unlike many Third World capitals, is a middle class city. According to one scholar, almost 80 percent of Cairenes rank in the middle class by Egyptian standards (see figure 2). The typical resident—literate, perhaps even with a university degree—certainly aspires to a middle class lifestyle. During the next two decades, the aspiring middle class could be swelled by the return of many overseas workers and professionals who are accustomed to high wages and (sometimes) superior living conditions in the Persian Gulf countries and elsewhere. Both old residents and returnees will feel increasingly cheated. It is a truism among students of political instability that, while the poor make riots, the politically aware middle classes make revolutions. ☐


### Soweto

The problems associated with rapid urbanization do not always hit entire urban areas; they can have a disproportionate effect on sections of a city, especially ghettos such as Johannesburg's Soweto. Johannesburg proper, South Africa's largest city with a population of more than 1.5 million, dates only from the late 1880s. According to official history, it was built around a mining camp in an area completely empty of native peoples. It grew up as a prosperous, largely white city with parks, clean, well-planned streets, skyscrapers, and pleasant residential districts. It would appear to face no extraordinary urbanization problems between now and the turn of the century. The same cannot be said for Johannesburg's black suburbs, the largest of which is Soweto (Southwest Township). Greater Soweto, with a population officially estimated at 1.2 million but believed by many experts to be much higher, has a population density at least twice that of Johannesburg as a whole. And Soweto's population is expected to double before the year 2000. ☐

Although Soweto, being based on race rather than social class, has both rich and poor, it is mostly poor and, according to some statistics, getting poorer. In all areas of public service, transportation, housing, sanitation, health, education, and personal security, Soweto ranks far below Johannesburg. Only 15 percent of the houses in Soweto have indoor plumbing and 20 to 25 percent have electricity, for example, while living conditions in Johannesburg are equal or superior to those of Europe and North America. Despite recent infusions of government money, conditions in Soweto will almost certainly worsen with the increase in population. ☐

We cannot say for sure how Soweto's urbanization problems will affect political stability; much will depend upon developments elsewhere in South Africa. At a minimum, we would expect occasional outbreaks of frustration like the violent uprising and even more violent repression that took place in Soweto in 1976. At a maximum, the year 2000 might see Soweto as a de facto independent city-state in a state of semihostility with the rest of the country. Sowetans would still

**Figure 2**  
**Socioeconomic Classes in Cairo\***



\* A privately financed survey conducted in 1979 in nine wards of Cairo considered to be representative of Cairo's population provided information on relative class positions and income. The Cairo poverty line for 1979 was assumed to be slightly over \$700. The results of this survey apply only to Cairo and should not be generalized to class configuration in urban Egypt as a whole owing to the great concentration in Cairo of power, wealth, goods, services, and high-level manpower that make it unique among Egyptian cities.

enter Johannesburg to work, but white South African authority would only be nominally exercised over Soweto. In such a situation, any effective movement to assert South African control would probably require either a siege or a full-scale military attack.

#### **Resources: Three Countries Whose Main Products May Have No Future**

Although in the very long term—well beyond the year 2000—the supply of certain resources may present critical problems, such shortages are unlikely during

the next two decades. Indeed, the problem is likely to be one of overabundance and falling real prices. In this section, we examine three countries—Zambia, Bolivia, and Cuba—whose principal products—copper, tin, and sugar—may be worth much less at the turn of the century than they are today. ☐

#### **Zambia and Copper**

The days of rapid growth in copper demand are gone, and prospects for even modest increases to the year 2000 seem poor. While substitution, conservation, and recycling limit demand, output continues to increase. As a result, the real price of copper has fallen to about 40 percent of what it was in 1970. Any marked increase in copper demand is most unlikely to come from the mature economies of the West, where substitution and conservation are farthest advanced and basic infrastructure is largely complete. The LDC economies, which provided most of the increase in demand for copper since 1960, are now stagnating and the chances that they will return to the robust growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s are slim. While favorable combinations of circumstances will undoubtedly cause rises in the real price of copper in some fortunate years, the trend will continue downward. By the year 2000, a ton of copper will buy much fewer goods and services than today. ☐

A number of countries, such as Chile and Zaire, are suffering and will continue to suffer from the decline in the copper market, but no country stands to lose as much as Zambia. Zambia depends upon copper for 90 percent of its export earnings, compared with 45 percent for Chile and 40 percent for Zaire. Moreover, unlike Chile, where some diversification of exports is taking place and the share of copper in total exports has fallen sharply, Zambia seems unable to reduce its dependence—when copper export earnings fall, total export earnings tend to fall by a like amount. This is due in large part to the fact that the market for Zambia's second most important export, cobalt, is little better than that for copper. ☐

Zambia has the reputation for being one of the more orderly and pro-Western states of southern Africa; because of the decline in copper, it is unlikely to retain that reputation at the turn of the century. In a Third World country such as Zambia, with strong and

independent trade unions and at least somewhat meaningful elections, a ruler needs prosperity—or at least the promise of prosperity—to stay in power. When a convincing promise of prosperity cannot be made—and it will be more and more difficult to make such a promise as the century comes to a close—the leader either falls or stays in power through increasingly less democratic means, often with the help of an outside power such as the Soviet Union. Zambia already appears to have taken the first steps along this path. ☐

#### **Bolivia and Tin**

Of all the metals, tin has been the hardest hit by substitution and conservation. Over the past two decades, growth in tin usage has averaged less than 1 percent a year, and in the United States, the world's largest consumer of tin, consumption has actually fallen by about 30 percent since the late 1960s. Aluminum, plastics, and other materials have made substantial advances in tin's major application—canning. Moreover, even where tin is still used in canning, the amount needed has declined because of advances in electrolytic tinplating. These factors have significantly cut the growth in tin demand, and we expect this trend to intensify as other countries incorporate these technologies. ☐

Bolivia, which depends upon tin for roughly 40 percent of its export earnings, will be harder hit than most major producers. It is the highest cost producer because its tin is mined by expensive underground methods as opposed to the surface methods used by other major producers. Moreover, the outlook for its other major export, natural gas, which currently provides another 40 percent of export earnings, is clouded by a number of factors. Even if reserves are sufficient to allow expansion of natural gas exports to counteract the effect of declining tin earnings—something that has not been determined—greatly increased exports would require costly additions to pipelines and facilities, as well as increases in Argentine and/or Brazilian demand. ☐

### **Other Countries Threatened With Loss of Commodity Markets**

*In the years to come, Western demand for basic raw materials is likely to be dampened both by technological change and a movement to more service-oriented economies. The impact of these changes is likely to be strongest in regions that remain heavily dependent on a few basic raw materials. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the percentage of countries in which three or fewer commodities account for more than half of total exports increased from 61 percent in 1970 to 85 percent in 1977.* ☐

*Liberia and Mauritania, which depend on iron ore for roughly three-fifths of their total export earnings, could be among the hardest hit of Sub-Saharan countries. This threat stems from a slowdown in the intensity of steel usage in the developed West and from an increase in recycling and substitution. At present, roughly a quarter of all steel in the developed West is recycled. Competition from other products, such as composites, graphites, and plastics is intensifying, and this will also limit demand growth for iron ore in the years ahead.* ☐

*Even in regions where exports are less concentrated, individual countries will find themselves in for rough sledding. Countries that depend heavily on the sale of natural fibers for export earnings, for example, will continue to lose market shares to synthetic materials. Bangladesh, where jute accounts for more than 50 percent of export earnings, and Upper Volta and the Yemen Arab Republic, where cotton supplies more than two-fifths of export revenues, will face rapidly declining markets as synthetics gain momentum. Manmade fibers, which represented only 2 percent of total world fiber output in the 1950s, now account for 44 percent of the market. In the United States, synthetics hold 75 percent of the overall textile market. As other countries approach the US level of synthetics use, prospects for natural fibers will further deteriorate.* ☐

The decline in export earnings is unlikely to have a great impact either on political stability or on the living conditions of the nation's rural Indian majority—both are already abysmal. (Indeed, over the long

run, a decline in the importance of the mining sector and its powerful unions is as likely to bode well as ill for political stability.) Rather, the principal impact on US interests will probably result from a great increase in the production and export of cocaine. Bolivian groups, often with the help of government officials, already produce almost half of the coca paste that eventually reaches the US market in refined form. The possibilities for expansion are virtually unlimited; the cost of producing coca paste in Bolivia is probably somewhat less than in Peru and certainly less than in Colombia, the other main producers. If, as seems possible, cocaine becomes Bolivia's only viable substitute for tin as a foreign exchange earner, many Bolivians who have heretofore abstained from the trade may be forced to adopt it. The nation's small middle class and its politically powerful military could feel that it is the only way to maintain "civilized" living standards. ☐

### **Cuba and Sugar**

Except for a few years of major crop failures, world sugar production has consistently outpaced consumption since World War II, and the value of sugar in real terms has trended downward. Areas such as Western Europe that were once net importers are now substantial exporters, and sugar stocks have risen to about 40 percent of global consumption. Overhanging stocks and falling prices have not led to a reduction in output for a variety of reasons:

- Exporters, especially from "one crop" nations, attempt to maintain total export earnings by increasing production to offset falling prices.
- Governments encourage production with subsidies to protect farm incomes and minimize imports.
- Major consuming nations, including the USSR and the United States, pay prices well above those of the world market to selected LDC producers.
- Sugarcane will produce for a number of years before replanting is necessary.
- The shift from cane to other crops is often difficult and expensive.
- Factories built to refine sugar cannot be used for other purposes. ☐

Sugar markets will probably be no better in the future than they were in the past. No major producer in either the developed or developing world is taking steps to cut back production, and most producing countries are encouraging an expansion of output. While exporting countries are making elaborate plans to increase exports, importing countries are establishing programs for self-sufficiency. At the same time, per capita sugar consumption in the developed countries is falling because of changes in diet and increased use of sugar substitutes in soft drinks and other food products. Although total consumption in the Third World is still increasing, the rate of increase should fall steadily between now and the end of the century as the LDCs continue to follow the lead of the industrial nations in adopting sugar substitutes. ☐

No country is as dependent upon sugar as Cuba. Cuba generally produces between 6 million and 8 million tons each year and exports all but about 500,000 tons. Typically, earnings from sugar account for between 80 and 90 percent of total export earnings. Havana has not been able either to break its dependence on sugar or to make effective use of its comparative advantage in this product. Castro's attempts to diversify the economy have been almost complete failures, while his spasmodic attempts to greatly expand sugar earnings—the "10 million ton" effort in 1970—not only failed to reach their targets but also disrupted other economic activity and lowered public morale. ☐

If, as seems likely, Cuba is unable to diversify its exports over the next two decades—and the outlook for other Cuban products such as nickel, tobacco, and fish is not promising—two political outcomes are possible. By the year 2000, greatly expanded world sugar production, combined with limited growth in world consumption, will have lowered real prices on the world market and reduced possibilities for Cuban sales to new buyers. To avoid a marked decline in the Cuban standard of living in this situation, the USSR would have to increase substantially both the price subsidy and the amount of sugar purchased. If the Soviet Union is willing to carry this burden, any post-Castro government would be very reluctant to move out of the Soviet orbit. If, on the other hand, the USSR cannot or will not continue to subsidize the Cuban economy at ever higher costs, the Soviet-Cuban link would be progressively weakened. Under

these circumstances (and assuming that the USSR does not occupy the island militarily), a post-Castro government could be tempted to make a radical change in foreign policy if it were assured of adequate economic benefits elsewhere ☐

#### **Water: Three Areas United— and Divided—by River Systems**

In arid areas of the world, including parts of the US west, water has long been a source of conflict. Today, the quantity and quality of water available have become an international issue. During the next two decades, as population pressures increase, demand for water for agriculture, industry, and human consumption will also increase, and water-related conflicts will almost certainly intensify. In this section, we examine three regions where the sharing of water could become an overriding political problem: United States-Mexico, Syria-Lebanon-Jordan-Israel, and Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt. ☐

##### **United States-Mexico**

Two rivers—the Rio Grande and the Colorado—are of vital importance to vast areas of both Mexico and the United States. This fact lies behind a century of both friction and cooperation, magnanimous gestures and petty foot-dragging, demagoguery and statesmanship. The principal bones of contention are: territory, water supply, and pollution. Territorial issues arise when a change in the course of a river leaves US land and population on the Mexican side of the river or vice versa. Water supply issues arise when Mexico claims that US farms, industries, and population are using more than their "fair" share of the joint supply. Pollution issues arise when usage in one country affects water purity in the other. All of these issues have been repeatedly "solved" in a series of treaties beginning in 1884. It is safe to predict that all will have to be "solved" again in the future under economic, demographic, and ecological conditions that will make achievement of even partial solutions much more difficult than in the past ☐

The territory problem is perhaps the most soluble. According to the most recent treaty (1970), when a river changes its channel and shifts not more than 617.76 acres and 100 inhabitants from one side of the river to the other, the country from which the tract is separated has the right to restore the river to its original channel within three years. If restoration is not performed, sovereignty passes to the other country with the original country receiving later compensation of an equal area elsewhere on the river. If the separated tracts exceed the area or population requirements, the two nations will jointly restore the river. In practice, the difficulties of finding equal areas elsewhere on the river and the expenses of rechanneling the river will probably lead to more frictions and additional treaties. ☐

Most future problems are likely to arise in the related areas of water supply and water quality. Mexico is almost certain to consider present supply agreements, based largely on past usage, inadequate as Mexican population, industry, and agriculture expand in the border region. The issue of ground water, which is unregulated by treaty, will become increasingly important. Salinity problems, especially in the Colorado, have already caused serious disputes, not least because even a temporary solution would require the construction of very expensive projects in the United States that would almost exclusively benefit Mexico. Water pollution is an issue that cuts both ways, however. Sewage from Mexican cities affects US cities in many border areas. The New River, for example, which rises in Mexico and flows through California's Imperial Valley is so badly polluted that US health officials have predicted epidemics. Given the huge costs of the measures required to combat salinity and pollution and the financial constraints on both Mexico and the United States, these problems are likely to worsen. ☐

In the year 2000, water conflicts will almost certainly reinforce whatever other differences may exist between Mexico and the United States. Despite efforts by both Washington and Mexico City, it has proved almost impossible to depoliticize the water issue. Politically powerful local interests on both sides of the border that have been directly hurt by water problems often see politicization of the issue as the only means to move the foreign policy establishments of their

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#### **Other River Systems That Could Become Focuses of Conflict**

*Aside from the three cases we examine in the body of the paper, we do not believe that water disputes will become major sources of friction in the absence of other causes of conflict. There are, however, a few troublesome situations that should be watched. The use of the waters of the River Plate-Parana-Paraguay system for irrigation, navigation, and power generation has long been a source of dispute between Argentina and Brazil. As Brazil continues to build dams on the upper part of the system to supply its growing power needs—and in so doing exerts an increasing hegemony over Paraguay—Buenos Aires could come to feel that its interests are seriously threatened. Another South American "water" dispute that is likely to continue to cause international problems is Bolivia's demand for an outlet to the sea. Elsewhere in the world, we would not be surprised to see continuing conflict between Bangladesh and India over the Ganges. Disputes are also likely among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over water usage and boundary questions related to the Euphrates River system.* ☐

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respective governments. Moreover, as past experience has shown, presumed threats to the health and employment of masses of people in either country are by their nature emotion laden and easy to dramatize. ☐

#### **Syria-Lebanon-Jordan-Israel**

The four countries tied together by the Jordan River system share a tangle of historical claims, a proclivity for violence, a mutual hatred, and, not least, water. As a result, water rights have been the subject of endless disputes that have even led to military strikes and threats of strikes on each other's water facilities. Syria and Lebanon, which control most of the headwaters of the Jordan, attempted to cut water supplies to their enemies in Israel for political reasons but were thwarted by Israeli airstrikes. Israel uses the lion's share of Jordan's waters and has long wanted to divert



the waters of Lebanon's Litani for its own use. Jordan and Israel, though complaining heatedly about each other's water consumption and practices, begrudgingly accept the duty to share water.

We doubt, however, that this standoff will continue over the next two decades. Israel's military victories on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon have given it control over the Litani and most of the northern tributaries of the Jordan. Its demand for water is projected to grow by at least 30 percent between now and the turn of the century. There are only two ways that Israel can obtain all the additional water it believes it needs: by constructing extremely expensive facilities for desalinization, reclamation of waste water, and the like, or by taking water that is now used by Lebanon or Jordan.<sup>3</sup> Tel Aviv is proud of its technically very efficient use of water and regards its neighbors as being wasteful of this resource. Some Israelis appear to believe that this more efficient usage gives Israel the right to water now being "wasted" by the Arabs and are pushing Tel Aviv to take the second course. Given the expense and uncertainties of the first course and the economic constraints that Israel faces, we believe that the temptation to take the second course could eventually prove irresistible. Indeed, it has already taken this course with regard to much ground water formerly controlled by West Bank Arabs.

By the year 2000, if not long before, the water problem will begin to affect US interests. (Indeed, the United States already finds itself in the uncomfortable position of go-between in Israeli-Jordanian water disputes.) Jordanian demand for water has already grown beyond available supplies, and Lebanon plans to use all its resources when the security situation permits. Although these two nations could obtain some additional water through the construction of dams and other facilities and the use of more efficient methods, they—like Israel—will be constrained financially from making the huge investments required to greatly increase supplies. In this situation, unless foreign donors are willing to finance extensive water projects in one or more of the nations, any advances

<sup>3</sup> Syria is already making increasing use of Jordan tributaries to expand farming in its southern region, further impinging upon the water supplies of both Jordan and Israel and further complicating the problem.

by Israel are likely to be made at the direct expense of its neighbors. All of the countries involved may well request US or Arab aid. We believe, however, that the richer Arab countries would be very reluctant to finance projects that could be seen as condoning an increased share of water for Israel. If US financing is not available—and perhaps even if it is—water resources would give Israel additional incentive to maintain its occupation of (or to reoccupy) foreign territory.


#### **Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt**

It is a truism that Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Sudan owe their existence to the Nile. The Nile is the basis of agriculture in both countries and supplies nearly all of the household and industrial water needs of Egypt and more than half of those of Sudan. Although the two countries have peacefully shared Nile water under a series of agreements since 1929, requirements are growing and both countries must either find new sources of water or sharply improve their management of existing resources. Egypt's gross water requirements, for example, are expected to rise between 16 and 25 percent by the year 2000. Given the already intensive use of the waters of the lower Nile, any attempt to meet these needs fully would require that Cairo not only take unilateral measures—better management of drainage water, higher water charges, and introduction of better irrigation systems—but also join with Khartoum in a number of very expensive projects—canals, dams, and reservoirs—to shift unused water from the swamps of southern Sudan to the thirsty north.

The water supplies of both Egypt and Sudan face a potential threat from Ethiopia, which controls the headwaters of the rivers that together provide about 85 percent of the Nile's total annual flow. Ethiopia has not participated in any Nile water-sharing agreement and has gone on record to affirm the right of any riparian state, in the absence of a formal international agreement, to unilaterally develop the water resources within its boundaries. Although at present Ethiopia uses relatively little Nile water and does not have the technical or financial resources to undertake the types of projects that would divert major amounts of water,



### Figure 4 The Nile Basin



it could at some point in the future receive powerful help from the Soviet Union. Ethiopia is a quasi-Marxist ally of the USSR and an enemy of Sudan and Egypt; it is certainly conceivable that Moscow might be tempted to reward Addis Ababa for its friendship and punish Cairo and Khartoum for their rejection. This would be all the more tempting because Moscow could portray the project as a humanitarian effort to help a needy country develop the means to feed its masses. ☐

The waters of the Nile are so essential to Egyptian life that we have no doubt that Cairo would be willing to go to war to protect its rights in this area. In the worst of cases, Soviet citizens or even Soviet troops could become involved—a development that could also draw in the United States. Under a different set of circumstances, Cairo might see itself obliged to intervene militarily in Sudan if Khartoum faced a revolt in those southern areas where joint water projects were under construction. ☐

#### **Food: Two Regions Where Food Could Become a Major Political Factor**

In sharp contrast to other areas of the developing world, where food supplies are increasing, per capita food production in Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by more than 20 percent from its 1961-65 average; caloric intake is well below nutritional requirements and is getting worse. This reflects not only persistent climatic problems and technological and management failures, but also the highest population growth rate for any region of the Third World. Food shortages and rising prices, which have already sparked political turmoil from Liberia to Madagascar, will almost certainly worsen over the next two decades. In this section we consider two very different regions of the continent—the Sahel and southern Africa—where we expect food problems to have a political impact. ☐

##### **The Sahel**

In no part of Africa has the food problem hit as hard as in the Sahel, an area that includes Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. Most of these nations rank among Africa's poorest in terms of nutrition, education, per capita income, and other indicators of social

and economic well-being. The northern parts of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad are desert, with little or no agricultural or pastoral potential. The southern parts of these countries and much of Senegal and Upper Volta form a semiarid savannah suitable mostly for pastorage. The Gambia, small areas of southern Senegal and Upper Volta, and the extreme south of Chad constitute the only part of the Sahel with a reasonably favorable climate for such crops as millet, sorghum, corn, cassava, peanuts, and cotton. In no country is more than a quarter of the land suitable for cultivation; in most countries it is well under 15 percent. ☐

The situation is rapidly worsening. From the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, the area suffered a drought that many climatologists believe is part of a long-term fundamental shift that will render much of the region uninhabitable by the turn of the century. Since the end of the six-year, Sahel-wide drought, smaller areas of the region have been hit by severe droughts of shorter duration. In effect, according to some authorities, the Sahara has been encroaching upon the savannah and the savannah upon the agricultural area at a rate of several kilometers a year. At the same time, the number of people the land must support is rapidly increasing. The total population of the eight countries, 31.7 million in 1980, is projected to reach 55.8 million in the year 2000, a 76-percent increase. ☐

The worsening food-population problem is almost certain to affect political stability and US interests. As northern pastoralists move south to escape starvation—some 100,000 are said to have died in a single year during the drought of the early 1970s—their herds will speed the desertification of the savannah through overgrazing. Food imports, already high in most of the area, will have to rise at a time when the countries will be increasingly hard pressed to produce the agricultural exports—peanuts and cotton—needed to pay for them. Requests for massive food aid from the West are likely. Moreover, as the northerners—whose ethnic, religious, and cultural makeup is often different from that of the southerners—move

### ***The Food Situation Elsewhere in the Third World***

*Beyond the Sub-Saharan region, Third World food availability increased dramatically between 1960 and 1980. At the beginning of this period, less than 40 percent of the 54 countries surveyed met the World Health Organization's recommended minimum per capita requirement of 2,300 calories a day and only six nations consumed significantly more (110 percent) than this minimum. By 1980 more than 80 percent of these countries surpassed the minimum and nearly half consumed more than 2,500 calories per person per day. Nonetheless, the average daily caloric consumption in these countries remains less than 110 percent of the minimum, well below the 131-percent average enjoyed by the industrial market countries.* ☐

*Projections of food availability to the end of the century are unavailable. If present trends continue, the average level of daily per capita calorie consumption among these countries could exceed the minimum requirement by a substantial margin. However, recent World Bank figures indicate that, in spite of strong growth in agricultural production, the average index of per capita food production during 1978-80 was lower in 23 of the survey countries—including such nations as Egypt, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Peru, and Uruguay—than it was in 1969-71. Rapid population growth, coupled with increased consumption, is outpacing the growth in food production.* ☐

*The estimates for minimum caloric needs in the aggregate—for a nation as a whole—are minimums indeed. The distribution of food to all households and the affordability of sufficient quantities of food to meet the requirements of poorer segments of the population are likely to be highly uneven. Whether current levels of caloric consumption are above or below the recommended minimum, all of the developing world will need to increase either food production or food imports by substantial margins if they are to satisfy the needs of the year 2000.* ☐

south, both intrastate and interstate conflict become probable. In this situation, radical Libyans or others may be tempted to step in and "help" one or another party. ☐

### **Southern Africa**

The countries of southern Africa—Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—are better off in almost every respect than those of the Sahel. Life expectancy, infant mortality rates, nutrition levels, per capita incomes, and education generally are relatively good within the African context, though considerable differences exist among the states. Areas of these countries are considered among the most suitable in Africa for production of beef, rice, sorghum, corn, millet, tobacco, tea, and sugar. Commercial farming is advanced in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland. Moreover, unlike much of Africa, nonagricultural activities such as mining in many of the countries and manufacturing in Zimbabwe are well developed. Urbanization is also relatively high, with one southern African country, Zambia, having the highest rate of all of black Africa. ☐

Now, however, a number of factors—internal and external, natural and manmade—are combining to create serious food problems. Only two countries, Malawi and Zimbabwe, remain self-sufficient in food, and the outlook even for these two is not promising. The other countries are increasingly dependent on food imports from a semihostile Republic of South Africa. The reasons for this situation are many. Civil war, guerrilla activity, and South African military operations are disrupting agriculture in most of the larger states. The departure of the Portuguese from Mozambique and the ambiguous status of the large, white-owned farms in Zimbabwe are bringing about serious management problems and some decapitalization of agriculture. State management of formerly private commercial farms in Madagascar and Mozambique has resulted in a sharp fall in production. Traditional communal grazing in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland has led to considerable ecological damage. Governments in mineral-exporting states such as Zambia and Botswana have neglected agricultural investment. Virtually all countries in the area have discouraged farm output by attempting to hold down food prices for their large urban populations. Agricultural infrastructure has been allowed to

deteriorate, breeding stock has been killed, and livestock diseases long under control are making a virulent comeback. In addition to all this, occasional droughts greatly worsen the situation of all countries and force even self-sufficient Zimbabwe and Malawi to import food. ☐

We do not expect the situation in most southern African countries to improve over the next two decades. Although most of southern Africa's food problems—unlike those of the Sahel—are man made, this does not greatly improve the outlook for their solution. White expertise and agricultural capital are not likely to pour back into the area. Tribal and ideological conflicts are likely to continue to take their toll of farms and farmers. South Africa probably will continue to make trouble on a selective basis. Scarce funds will continue to be spent to pacify volatile urban populations and interest groups, rather than to support agriculture. And the area's population will soar by 86 percent, to 78.6 million, by the turn of the century. A few countries, through an extraordinary combination of good luck and wise policy, may do well, but southern Africa as a whole is almost certain to be worse off in the year 2000 than it is today. ☐

We expect this to affect US interests in two ways. First, the United States and other Western countries will be pressed to supply food aid and very possibly to finance major water and agricultural projects. Second, a number of what are now independent nations are likely to lose a large measure of their sovereignty to South Africa. Most of the food that these countries will require in increasing quantities will either be produced in South Africa or be imported through South African ports. Likewise, most of the exports—be they minerals, tobacco, or labor—that these countries must sell to buy their food will go either to or through South Africa. Such economic dependence is incompatible with political independence. ☐

#### Implications for the United States

Our examination of trends in the Third World through the year 2000 has been of necessity illustrative rather than exhaustive. Thus, we are in no position to spell out in great detail the implications for

the United States. US interests in the Third World will depend not only on what happens in that area, but also on developments at home, in the Communist world, and among the developed nations of the West. Unforeseeable changes in leadership, technology, and ecology anywhere in the world could have an impact on what the United States needs from and can give to the various developing nations. Some things, however, can be said. In this section, we point out a few places where the various trends that we have discussed may reinforce or counteract each other in ways that could affect US interests. We also make some very tentative predictions about the overall political climate of the Third World in the year 2000. ☐

#### Putting It All Together

The US relationship with Mexico may encompass the most important complex of problems that the US Government will face in the year 2000. The Mexican Government's need to divert population from greater Mexico City, by force if necessary, will impact upon migrant flows across the US border—which will already be sharply up for demographic reasons—as well as upon political stability in the US backyard. At the same time, water and pollution problems along the border could exacerbate bilateral relations while driving unwanted migrants both to overcrowded Mexico City and into the United States. ☐

The most important US allies in the Middle East may be in a much worse position both economically and politically than they are today. Egypt, beset with destabilizing population and urbanization pressures, may push outward in military adventures or succumb to revolution. Water-related problems with Sudan or, more likely, Ethiopia could easily become the pretext for war. Israel, increasingly less Western and very possibly less democratic, could be in ethnic and religious turmoil as relative populations change. It will almost certainly be in conflict with other US friends such as Jordan and Lebanon over the waters of the Jordan and the Litani. Lebanon, for its part, may no longer exist as an independent state. ☐

US neighbors and friends elsewhere may be in no better shape. Demographic differences are likely to overcome political and ideological similarities and drive El Salvador and Honduras into conflict and possibly war. The resulting refugee flows would add to Mexico's complex of problems as well as swell the influx across the US border. Other states of the Western Hemisphere, of which Bolivia is a good example, may see their raw material exports become increasingly worthless. A number of African nations such as Zambia may be in a similar situation. ☐

The Republic of South Africa and its neighbors will be subject to a variety of conflicting currents. Demographic change within the white and black communities may make the white (or rather "nonblack") group more liberal and the black group more radical. An English-speaking white-Colored-Indian coalition may be more disposed either to compromise or to fight than the old Boer-controlled minority, while the black majority would be more disposed to fight than to coexist. Black townships such as Soweto could become flashpoints. At the same time, white South Africa would be in a much more advantageous position with regard to neighboring black nations, which will be increasingly dependent upon Pretoria for food and trade links. The declining real value of copper will make Zambia doubly vulnerable. ☐

Problems and opportunities will also arise in the Communist Third World. Post-Castro Cuba, dependent upon sugar sales in a chronically depressed world market might well be willing to auction off its political loyalty to whichever superpower is ready and able to support an economic basket case. On the other side of the world, overpopulated Vietnam will probably be expanding into underpopulated Laos and Kampuchea—and perhaps bringing the Soviet Union and China to the brink of war. ☐

#### **The Political Climate in the Year 2000**

The political climate in the Third World in the year 2000 may make the preservation and propagation of democracy in that area even more difficult than it is today. Although many Third World leaders and peoples will continue to admire the US political system—and especially the US economy and standard of living—the danger is that they will see it not only

as impossible to achieve but also as counterproductive with respect to solving their most pressing demographic and economic problems. ☐

Compared with the Western democracies and the Communist states, most countries of the Third World have extremely weak governments. Typically their leaders, even their most brutal dictators, have little effective power. Their legislatures and judiciaries have even less. The typical president must spend all his energy trying to stay on top of an uneasy coalition of interest groups; he has no time to advance the cause of the nation, even if he has the wisdom and desire to do so. He must bribe with opportunities or with unaffordable arms not only generals, but also colonels and even NCOs. Religious leaders, tribal chiefs, students, landowners, local capitalists, union bosses, the urban mob, police death squads, the IMF, multinational corporations, the press, and representatives of foreign powers may have an effective veto over presidential action. And these are the government's supporters. Enemies—guerrillas in the mountains, subversives in the university, perhaps ideological opponents within the president's own party—want not only to bring down the ruler, but to destroy the state itself. ☐

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that few Third World leaders have opted for democracy. They apparently believe that political and economic power are already too diffused for effective government and that to diffuse it still more would be to invite anarchy. As the century comes to a close and many countries begin to suffer increasing demographic, resource, and economic pressures of the types that we have described in this paper, we suspect that leaders will be even more reluctant to consider any experiment that might further undermine their already shaky control over the political process. ☐

Some leaders may well be tempted by the Communist system. In most cases, this will not be because they have failed to notice the injustices and failures of Communist states throughout the world. These leaders who opt for Communism "with their eyes open" may not even have much sympathy for Marxist

ideology. What they will be seeking in Communism is a proven method of controlling their own people, for allowing decisions to be enforced, for avoiding anarchy in the face of insurmountable economic problems. Unlike Third World idealists of an earlier era who were attracted to Communism, these hard-headed leaders will not be looking for utopia but rather for an effective police state. ☐

Other Third World leaders, especially those who cannot stomach totalitarianism in any form, may be attracted to the more successful authoritarian systems. At present, these include Mexico, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and perhaps a few others. By the year 2000, some of these may have fallen by the wayside. The Mexican system may not be able to stand up to the complex of problems we have outlined in this paper. Taiwan may fall under the shadow of China. South Korea could come apart because of its still sloppy succession mechanism. Based on their past record, however, most of these states will still be around and doing well in Third World terms. These countries, unlike the Communist states, promise economic progress, considerable diversity, and a large measure of personal freedom. And, unlike such Third World democracies and "failed" authoritarian states as Venezuela and Argentina, they also promise the high degree of public discipline required to enforce unpopular but necessary economic measures over an extended period of time. ☐

#### **Implications for US-Soviet Competition**

Although the situation in the Third World in the year 2000 will present advantages and disadvantages for both the Soviet Union and the United States, internal developments and policy mistakes could limit either country's ability to make use of the advantages presented. In this section, we will examine these advantages and disadvantages, the opportunities for meddling, and some possible outcomes. We do not, however, have room in this paper to examine all the factors that could play a role in the actual outcomes. ☐

As we mentioned in the previous section, many Third World leaders will look to the Communist model of police state as a means of controlling their populations in a deteriorating economic and demographic environment. We are already seeing the popularity of Cuban

bodyguards, East German intelligence advisers, and Communist-style neighborhood security organizations with Third World leaders who may have little deep identification with Communist ideology. The negative side of this for the USSR is that Communist troops, technicians, and advisers are usually detested wherever they go. Countries such as Egypt that have once had large numbers of Soviet personnel within their borders are unlikely to again flirt with the Soviets once they have broken free. ☐

On balance, we think that the Soviets will find their best opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa. We believe that many African countries will be drawn to the USSR for the following reasons:

- Unlike in Asia and Latin America, there are no outstanding "successful authoritarian" states in the region to serve as alternate models.
- US association with South Africa will continue to alienate black Africans.
- Conditions in some countries will have deteriorated too far to be turned around with reasonable amounts of economic aid (the West's strength).
- Local leaders will see police-state measures (the Soviet strength) as their best chance to maintain control.


In the event that the Angolan Communist regime were decisively defeated by UNITA despite massive Soviet and Cuban support, the Communist attraction for Sub-Saharan leaders would be considerably lessened. ☐

In the Middle East, the Soviets may lose ground. Iraq, and very possibly Syria and South Yemen, may go the way of Egypt as the Soviet presence becomes more onerous and other sources of military aid become available. The passing of Khomeini and possibly Qadhafi will probably lead to regimes in Iran and Libya that are more open to Western influence; we doubt that either country would move into the Soviet camp in the absence of Soviet military action. The USSR's losses will not translate into unequivocal gains for the United States. Our strongest friends in the area—Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon—may all be weaker than today and some

may be distancing themselves from the United States. In South Asia, there is a slim possibility that the Soviets could make major gains in either India or Pakistan; much will depend on the results of the fighting in Afghanistan.

In Latin America, the USSR probably will be able to maintain its position in Cuba—and perhaps in Nicaragua, if that is not decided in the next year or so—as long as it is willing to pay the increasing economic price. There is a good chance that the economic costs will prove so great as to limit the Soviet appetite for extensive meddling in this hemisphere. The Soviets will, of course, take anything that falls into their lap, but little is likely to. We believe that most Latin American states will be more attracted by the “successful authoritarian” model than by the Communist model. Most of these countries will try to maintain a distance from the United States as well, and conflicts will be frequent. The US democratic model may be seen as increasingly less relevant to Latin needs, with democracies such as Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica assuming a more authoritarian cast. At the same time, in many countries the domestic private sector—probably a necessary base for US-style democracy—may see its position greatly eroded by better financed state enterprises and multinational corporations as an indirect result of conditions set by the international banking community.


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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


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
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


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
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
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